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Abstract 13 
Research into the connection between organizational effectiveness and culture has been 14 
documented since the early nineteen nineties. A connection between economic performance and 15 
organizational culture has been established directly linking strong cultural drivers to economic 16 
performance in both the finance and retail sectors. This research proposes a similar association 17 
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between food safety culture, the measures of maturity and cost of poor quality. Through data 18 
collected at five multi-national food companies, this association is explored, and an improved 19 
food safety maturity model suggested. The authors also propose a dynamic model of food safety 20 
culture, segmenting it into 4 building blocks: I. Organizational effectiveness, II. Organizational 21 
culture norms, III. Working group learned and shared assumptions, and behaviours, and IV. 22 
Individual intent and behaviours; and discuss the crucial role of actions between building blocks 23 
as part of the pathway to realizing economic gain.   24 
Highlights 25 
1. Explores organizational culture, effectiveness, and performance in the food industry 26 
2. Demonstrates theoretical economic gain from building food safety culture maturity 27 
3. Refines and strengthens a food safety culture maturity model for practical application  28 
4. Proposes a dynamic model of food safety culture building block and interactions 29 
5. Empirical study of culture performance within five global food manufacturing companies 30 
Keywords 31 
Food safety culture, economic impact, food safety maturity model, cost of poor quality, 32 
food safety culture dynamic model. 33 
  34 




1. Introduction 36 
To solve the specific challenges related to food safety performance, e.g., consumer death, 37 
illness and injury (Maberry, 2016; World-Health-Organization, 2015), and impact on brand and 38 
economics (Hussain & Dawson, 2013; Ribera et al., 2012) throughout the food supply chain it is 39 
now widely recognized that food safety culture plays an integral role (Ball, Wilcock, & Aung, 40 
2009; Griffith, 2010; Griffith & Jackson, 2017; Nayak & Waterson, 2017; Powell, Jacob, & 41 
Chapman, 2011; Taylor, 2011). It is also understood that to get to a stronger sub-culture (e.g., 42 
safety culture, food safety culture, innovation culture) one must consider the broader 43 
organizational culture and its effectiveness (Denison, Hooijberg, Lane, & Lief, 2012; Denison & 44 
Mishra, 1995; Schein & Schein, 2017). Quoting Harvard Professor Emeritus James L. Heskett, 45 
“Organization culture is not a soft concept, its impact on profit can be measured and quantified. 46 
And in organizations with large numbers of customer-facing employees, the sum of the effects of 47 
employee turnover, referrals of potential employees by existing ones, productivity, customer 48 
loyalty, and referrals of new customers attributable to culture can add up to half of the difference 49 
in operating income between organizations in the same business” (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). It is 50 
this contrast between perceived soft (e.g., principles of organizational and behavioural sciences) 51 
and hard (e.g., financial performance) concepts that makes organizational cultures and sub-52 
cultures both intriguing and challenging for practitioners and scientists to understand and makes 53 
it important to conduct further work to elucidate how these concepts apply in different settings, 54 
e.g., food manufacturing, thus addressing the research gaps in these areas.  55 
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Crosby (1972) defines quality as ‘conformance to requirements’ and makes the claim that 56 
“management unintentionally cause an increased cost of quality for the organization by not 57 
understanding this simple definition.” Crosby also suggests, like Kotter and Heskett (1992), that 58 
a culture revolution through a planned strategy is the key to reducing cost of quality in any 59 
organization. Through the ‘Quality Management Maturity Grid’, Crosby defines six 60 
measurement categories by which an organization can evaluate its current stage of quality 61 
maturity. Using the grid, he demonstrates the connection between decreasing cost of quality and 62 
increasing quality culture maturity; thereby directly linking the culture of an organization to 63 
organizational financial performance. Crosby shows how as much as 20% of sales can be lost as 64 
cost of poor quality (COPQ) in contrast to losses in a high-level maturity culture of 2.5%. The 65 
American Society of Quality (ASQ) builds on the work by Crosby and divides COPQ into four 66 
activities: prevention costs, appraisal costs, and internal and external failure costs (Duffy, 2017). 67 
Through these activities, costs related to e.g., systems maintenance and training, conformance to 68 
specification, verification activities, waste and scrap, and complaints, are tracked to quantify the 69 
percentage of sales due to poor quality. Schiffauerova and Thomson, (2006) report that each 70 
industrial sector has unique quality cost elements but that there is no set structure or accounting 71 
standard for quality costing (Schiffauerova & Thomson, 2006). Thus, the decision on the cost 72 
structure of the COPQ model is generally left to the judgment of quality managers and may 73 
differ considerably between companies. Nevertheless, since prevention, appraisal, and review of 74 
internal and external failures have been related to food safety management effectiveness in food 75 
manufacturing companies (Hutton, 2001; Surak & Wilson, 2007; Wallace, Sperber, & 76 
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Mortimore, 2010), it is logical to surmise that costs of these activities will form quality cost 77 
elements for calculating COPQ in food manufacturing.  Thus, the authors of this research suggest 78 
that COPQ, as defined by Crosby and ASQ and applied to food companies, includes specific 79 
food safety metrics (Table 1) and is therefore a relevant measure for estimation of economic 80 
impact of a company’s food safety culture maturity, although this has not yet been tested by 81 
empirical research. 82 
(Table 1) 83 
In order to further explore the potential impact of food safety culture maturity on 84 
economic indicators such as COPQ, it is necessary to establish the relevant theoretical 85 
background in organisational and food safety culture.  This now follows along with a delineation 86 
of the aims of this research. 87 
2. Theoretical background and research aims 88 
2.1 Organizational culture, effectiveness and impact on financial gains 89 
Principles from organizational culture have been incorporated into research on food 90 
safety culture by most of the researchers in the field. As such, the authors seek to provide a 91 
review of research that specifically focused on showing the connection between organizational 92 
culture, organizational effectiveness and the impact of both on economic performance.  93 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) studied culture in 207 U.S. firms through surveys and detailed 94 
interviews and found a direct connection between organizational culture and financial 95 
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performance. While the authors clearly stated that many confounding variables impact an 96 
organization’s financial performance, they also discovered a substantial difference in financial 97 
performance between performance-enhancing cultures and non-performance enhancing cultures 98 
within two groups of 12 companies (Table 2). In the group that invested in a performance-99 
enhancing culture, the increase across the financial indicators ranged from more than 200% to 100 
more than 900% for specific indicators. Kotter and Heskett (1992) described ‘performance-101 
enhancing cultures’ as those which have organizational values that include managers deeply 102 
caring about customers, and strongly value people and processes that create useful change. 103 
Conversely values in non-performance enhancing cultures are described as managers mostly 104 
caring about themselves and their immediate work group and emphasising consistent 105 
management processes that reduce risks within their immediate area of responsibility. 106 
(Table 2) 107 
Similar to Kotter and Heskett (1992) Denison (1997) explored the connection between 108 
organizational culture and effectiveness. Denison’s research sought to answer the question “what 109 
can the cultural characteristics of an organization tell us about effectiveness?” and demonstrates 110 
the connection between four organizational traits: Involvement, Consistency, Adaptability, and 111 
Mission and organizational effectiveness. Denison measured organizational effectiveness 112 
through behavioural performance using the established scale ‘Survey of Organizations (SOO)’ 113 
and financial performance through income/sales ratio and income/investment ratio. Denison 114 
found a valid connection between these cultural traits to both behavioural performance and 115 
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financial effectiveness (Denison, 1997; Denison & Mishra, 1995). Graham et al. (2017) defined 116 
an effective culture as “one that promotes the behaviours needed to successfully execute the 117 
firm’s strategies and achieve its goals”. Data were gathered from 1,348 North American firms 118 
through surveys and interviews with senior executives. The authors found that organizational 119 
effectiveness is the result of interaction between an organizations values, norms, and formal 120 
systems (Graham et al. (2017). In this context, values are defined as the aspirations of the 121 
organization, norms as the day-to-day practices that live out the values, and formal systems as 122 
their written policies and procedures. Human behaviours are conditioned through the integration 123 
and adaptation of organizational norms, and norms are, in turn, an interpretation and adaptation 124 
to the organization’s values and formal systems. Graham et al. (2017) demonstrates that norms 125 
enhance business outcomes, but values do not. Their research also suggests that the marketplace 126 
influences executives’ investment in culture as well as the organizational values they promote 127 
(Graham et al. 2017). This external adaption is also captured in Schein’s updated (2017) 128 
definition of organizational culture as “... the accumulated shared learning of the group as it 129 
solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration…” (Schein & Schein, 2017). 130 
Schein thereby integrates external and internal triggers of change as confirmed by the findings of 131 
Graham et al. (2017).  132 
The ‘Great Place to Work® Institute’ is a global organization dedicated to providing 133 
knowledge on how to build and sustain high performing work place culture. Its database contains 134 
data from more than 5,500 companies operating in 45 countries collected through annual 135 
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assessment surveys and is used for the ‘Great Place to Work® Institute’ own publications on 136 
workplace culture as well as being made available for academic study (Great-Place-to-Work, 137 
2017). Through analysis of the survey data, researchers found that proclaimed values appeared 138 
irrelevant to an organization’s effectiveness (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2014). This supports 139 
the findings of Graham et al. (2017) that values alone do not drive business outcomes, but norms 140 
do. The research also shows that if executives are perceived as trustworthy and ethical the 141 
company’s performance will be stronger. In analysing S&P 500 companies the researchers found 142 
that 80% of the companies mention ‘innovation’ followed by ‘integrity and respect’ in their 143 
corporate values. A culture of integrity was found to add value and positively correlated with 144 
financial performance and attractiveness of job offerings and negatively correlated with the 145 
degree to which the company’s workforce was unionized or not (Guiso et al. 2014).  146 
Causality between culture and organizational effectiveness measured through 147 
performance, was proven in a six-year longitudinal study with car dealers. The study proved that 148 
‘culture does come first’ and performance will follow. Further, the positive effect of culture on 149 
vehicle sales was fully mediated by customer satisfaction ratings (Boyce, Nieminen, Gillespie, 150 
Ryan, & Denison, 2015).  151 
2.2 Measuring food safety culture maturity 152 
An extensive list of researchers (Ball et al., 2009; Boeck, Jacxsens, Bollaerts, & Vlerick, 153 
2015; Griffith, 2014; Hinsz & Nickell, 2015; Jespersen, Griffiths, & Wallace, 2017; Nayak & 154 
Waterson, 2017; Nickell & Hinsz, 2011; Nyarugwe, Linnemann, Hofstede, Fogliano, & Luning, 155 
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2016; Powell et al., 2011; Taylor, Garat, Simreen, & Sarieddine, 2015; Yiannas, 2009) have built 156 
the current knowledge base of food safety culture and its assessment and improvement,  which 157 
the authors seek to further through this research. 158 
Focussing on food safety culture maturity, Jespersen et al completed five studies aimed at 159 
measuring this construct (Jespersen & Edwards, Submitted; Jespersen, Griffiths, Maclaurin, 160 
Chapman, & Wallace, 2016; Jespersen, Griffiths, et al., 2017; Jespersen, MacLaurin, & Vlerick, 161 
2017; Jespersen & Wallace, 2017). The initial study (Jespersen et al., 2016) suggested that by 162 
applying a mixed method approach using quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (interviews 163 
and document coding) elements, a comprehensive insight could be gained through profiling 164 
using a maturity model. The initial model was built on principles from organizational culture, 165 
specifically Schein’s five dimensions (Schein, 2004) as well as learnings from maturity models 166 
in other domains: quality management (Crosby, 1972), health care (Goonan, Muzikowski, & 167 
Stoltz, 2009), and information technology (Ali, 2014). The progressive five stage food safety 168 
model breaks down food safety culture into five capability areas. To ensure content validity of 169 
the model a Delphi method was applied with three rounds of review and revision with a seven-170 
member panel. Following finalization of the model this was applied to the measurement of food 171 
safety culture at one Canadian protein company (Jespersen et al., 2016). To validate the model 172 
and mixed method a comparative study of eight existing evaluation systems was conducted 173 
(Denzin, 2012; Jespersen, Griffiths, et al., 2017). One of the key findings in the comparative 174 
study was general weakness in how the evaluation systems were validated. None of the 175 
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evaluation systems had applied and published a structured triangulation as a commonly applied 176 
method for validating social science scales (Denzin, 2012; Jespersen, Griffiths, et al., 2017). A 177 
content analysis method was proposed to accurately reflect an organization’s food safety culture  178 
(Jespersen, 2017; Jespersen & Edwards, Submitted; Jespersen & Wallace, 2017) as well as a 179 
method to assess response bias in the form of social desirability (Jespersen, MacLaurin, et al., 180 
2017). Five dimensions of food safety culture ( Values and Mission, People Systems, 181 
Adaptability, Consistency, and Risk Awareness) were proposed based on the results from the 182 
comparative study (Denzin, 2012; Jespersen, Griffiths, et al., 2017). These dimensions have been 183 
adopted by the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) in the GFSI position paper on a culture of 184 
food safety (Quentin & Jespersen, 2018). 185 
2.2.1 Development of a self-assessment scale  186 
The scale was developed by Jespersen et al. (2016) and includes question statements 187 
pertaining to four areas (Table 3) to measure food safety culture maturity; social norms, 188 
behavioural intent, motivation, and social desirability. Social norms are measures that relate to a 189 
person’s perception of what other people would approve of regarding given behaviours. The 190 
individual participants were asked a series of statements ‘Most people whose opinion I value 191 
would approve of…’.  Behavioural intent is measured through statements designed to gauge a 192 
participant’s intent to carry out a specific food safety behaviour consistently. Motivation in a 193 
cultural context is measured by asking the respondent to prioritize who in their social network 194 
they are motivated by to carry out food safety behaviours; manager, peers, family/friend, or self. 195 
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Social desirability is a social science research measure that quantifies the tendency of study 196 
participants to answer questions in a way to be viewed favourably by others. It can take the form 197 
of over-reporting ‘good behaviour’ or under-reporting ‘undesirable behaviour’ and rated on a 198 
scale from zero to 18. The objective is to get a score of zero where study participants answer 199 
truthfully independent of other’s views of them. Research can be advanced by considering social 200 
desirability, statistically speaking, as a control variable. By measuring humans’ tendency to 201 
answer food safety related questions in manner that will be viewed favourably by others, the 202 
food industry can get a more authentic and valid assessment of food safety culture (Jespersen, 203 
MacLaurin, et al., 2017).  204 
(Table 3) 205 
2.2.2 Developing a textual coding framework 206 
Textual data, including documents and, following transcription, semi-structured interview 207 
data involve large amounts of text that is commonly subjected to content analysis to determine 208 
patterns, trends and relationships as well as frequencies of words used in a document or by an 209 
interview subject (Vaismoradi et al, 2013).  A deductive content analysis approach was chosen in 210 
order to apply method triangulation to increase validity of food safety culture evaluation results.  211 
This used a coding framework based on the dimensions of food safety culture identified by 212 
Jespersen, Griffiths and Wallace (2017) from a study of eight culture or food safety culture 213 
evaluation systems.  The content analysis of food safety performance documents provided an 214 
insight into the documented food safety culture e.g., level of consistency, adaptability, and 215 
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perceived value of food safety, whilst the analysis of interview data explored the lived food 216 
safety culture as vocalized by the interview subjects. 217 
The process for developing the coding framework and coding content was reported by 218 
Jespersen and Wallace (2017) and is shown in annex 1.  Detailed research questions were 219 
defined (step 1) and the theoretical framework of five dimensions of food safety culture 220 
(Jespersen, Griffiths and Wallace (2016)) was used as a starting point for determination of 221 
coding nodes.   Two independent coders first read and re-read the data to gain an immersive 222 
sense of the whole before deducing appropriate sub-nodes and establishing the coding 223 
framework (step 2). The framework (annex 2) was an important component as it connects the 224 
coded data to the theoretical framework and the research domain.  The nodes and sub-notes were 225 
input into NVivo (step 3) and, following this, coders were trained (step 4) and two documents 226 
coded by same coders (step 5). The results were analyzed by detailed review of verbatim data to 227 
look for similarities and differences between coders. A decision was made to go back to the 228 
coding framework and update with addition of sub-nodes and to go back to the test documents 229 
for recoding (step 6). Following this loop, the decision was made to carry on with the full 230 
document coding as coders were considered “consistent” based on another detailed verbatim 231 
review (step 7). Midway discussions between coders allowed comparison of experience, and 232 
discussion of coding difficulties and issues. These results led to another rework of the two 233 
selected documents and finalization of the 30 documents (step 8). Finally, the data was analyzed 234 
to derive information to answer the research questions (step 9).   235 
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The process included two checks for consistency evaluated through calculation of 236 
percentage pairwise agreement. (Neuendorf, 2002) argues that the goal for pairwise agreement in 237 
social sciences often are .8 but that .9 levels are most appropriate. This higher threshold level has 238 
also been suggested to account for some weaknesses in this method (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & 239 
Bracken, 2002). Based on these references the standard for this research for pairwise agreement 240 
level was set to .9 (90% agreement). 241 
2.2.3 Constructing the food safety maturity model 242 
The maturity model was designed to assesses food safety culture on  a scale from zero to 243 
five. The model and scale are sub-divided into five stages each with a description of a capability 244 
area e.g., people systems at a given maturity score e.g., three. The descriptor for a company’s 245 
people system in a maturity stage three is ‘deep understanding for the importance of food safety 246 
systems with clearly defined and communicated responsibilities.’  247 
Each stage on the maturity scale has two identifiers a numerical and textual i.e., stage 248 
1/doubt, stage 2/react to, stage 3/know of, stage 4/predict, and stage 5/internalize. The numerical 249 
identifiers are aligned with the scale used in the online self-assessment. For example, a self-250 
assessment of two in the self-assessment equals a ‘disagree’ on the Likert scale of ‘strongly 251 
disagree to strongly agree ‘and a stage 2/react on the maturity scale. In addition, the maturity 252 
scale was aligned to the levels of Crosby’s Quality Management Maturity Grid (Crosby, 1972). 253 
To apply the maturity scale, all responses from each of the participants in the self-254 
assessment were added and a mean maturity rating for each capability area and aggregated mean 255 
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for all capability areas calculated. Depending on the mean ratings a maturity score for the 256 
capability areas, the plant over all, or the company over all could be estimated. As such, maturity 257 
ratings could fall into any of the five stages on the maturity scale and model, and an 258 
interpretation of stages could be provided based on the descriptors of the stages and the detailed 259 
content of the capability areas in the maturity model as shown in the maturity model construct 260 
(Table 4).  261 
2.3 Research aims 262 
As previously stated, gaps were identified relating to the validation of assessment methods 263 
(Jespersen, Griffiths and Wallace, 2017) and how food safety culture research has not yet 264 
progressed to include an evaluation of organizational performance and effectiveness. Thus, it is 265 
not currently possible to determine the impact of food safety culture on the economic 266 
performance of a business. Therefore, it is important to understand how validated assessment 267 
measures of food safety culture maturity can be combined with economic performance measures 268 
such as COPQ to understand how improvement of food safety culture can support business 269 
effectiveness. In order to move forward the debate in this area, this research aims to, 1) validate 270 
or revise the initial food safety maturity model based on new learnings, 2) apply the principles of 271 
cost of poor quality to assess economic value of maturing food safety culture, and 3) suggest a 272 
dynamic model that captures the constant interactions that cause sub-cultures to adapt to and 273 
integrate change in a food manufacturing setting. 274 
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3. Materials and methods 275 
This research was part of a large study of food safety culture performance conducted in 276 
collaboration with five multi-national North American-based food manufacturing companies 277 
from October 2015 to March 2016.  278 
3.1 Data collection at five global food manufacturing companies 279 
Five companies were approached to participate in the study based on their previous 280 
interests in the subject and willingness to have the researcher collect data virtually and on-site in 281 
all their manufacturing plants. Study data collection methods included an online survey, 282 
interviews and review of performance documents. Data were collected from 21 food 283 
manufacturing plants and 1,273 leaders in executive, management, and supervisory roles from all 284 
functional areas were asked to participate in the online survey, 379 documents were collected 285 
and coded, and 42 on-site interviews were conducted and coded (Table 5). 286 
(Table 5) 287 
3.2 Maturity calculation using method triangulation 288 
Three methods were applied in the study of triangulation (Jespersen and Wallace, 2017) 289 
with the aim of collectively minimizing the method weaknesses of the individual methods and 290 
providing complementary data from the plants under investigation based on the strengths and 291 
practicalities of each: Method 1- Self-assessment scale, analyzed quantitatively using SPSS; 292 
Method 2 – Performance document content analysis, qualitative analysis using NVivo; : Method 293 
Page 16 of 45 
 
 
3 – Semi-structured interviews, qualitative analysis using NVivo. Strengths and weaknesses of 294 
each method were explored and are reported elsewhere (Jespersen and Wallace, 2017). For 295 
example, survey and interviews can help assign causation, survey can help mitigate impact of 296 
interviewer skill and experience, content can help penetrate the group language and symbol 297 
mechanisms, content and survey can get data to close the attitude to behaviour gap, survey social 298 
desirability and interviews can help identify insincere respondents.  Application of the methods 299 
was as follows: 300 
Method 1: Self-assessment scale. All salaried staff in each manufacturing plant were 301 
invited to participate in an online survey between November 2015 and March 2016. The scale 302 
was developed by (Jespersen et al., 2016) and included questions pertaining to four areas to 303 
measure food safety culture maturity; social norms, behavioral intent, motivation, and social 304 
desirability. Response data were imported into SPSS [Computer Software] IBM Corporation, 305 
New York, U.S.A. from Qualtrics [Computer Software] Qualtrics, Provo, Utah, USA and readied 306 
(e.g., removal of incomplete data sets, reversal of negative scales) for analysis. An aggregated 307 
maturity score (mean and standard deviation) as well as maturity level by dimension (mean and 308 
standard deviation) were calculated for each plant with control for social desirability score 309 
(Jespersen, MacLaurin, et al., 2017). 310 
Method 2: Content analysis of performance documents. Each of the manufacturing plants 311 
were asked to share food safety documents (e.g., food safety audit reports, food safety meeting 312 
minutes, inspection reports, and Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) records) dating back 12-313 
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months from November 2015. Content analysis was applied to these documents using the 314 
predefined coding framework of Jespersen and Wallace (2017) (See 2.4 and Annexes 1 and 2) 315 
which was translated into nodes in NVivo [Computer Software] QSR International, Doncaster, 316 
Australia. Each document was imported into NVivo and all documents were coded by two 317 
researchers.  318 
Method 3: Content analysis of semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews 319 
with senior plant leader and senior food safety leader were arranged through the participating 320 
company sponsors. Senior leaders at a plant were all invited to participate and the focus on 321 
senior leaders was chosen as direction for an organizations culture is generally set at a senior 322 
level (Denison et al., 2012; Graham, Harvey, Popadak, & Rajgopal, 2017).  Interview questions 323 
were shared in advance with the interviewees and informed consent obtained for each interview. 324 
All interviews were recorded and each audio file transcribed and codified to ensure anonymity of 325 
the interview and uploaded to NVivo for content analysis. The same coding framework was used 326 
for the interview files as the food safety documents (Jespersen and Wallace, 2017) (See 2.4 and 327 
Annexes 1 and 2). 328 
3.3 Further development of the food safety maturity model 329 
Based on the findings in this research the model was revised to incorporate learnings 330 
from the five companies and increase its applicability. As such, the capability areas were 331 
evaluated against the dimensions found in the comparative analysis (Jespersen, Griffiths, et al., 332 
2017) and amended to better integrate learnings from organizational culture e.g., the first model 333 
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was found to have an overemphasis on the dimension ‘consistency’ through the capability areas 334 
process thinking, technology enabler, and tools/infrastructure but an under representation of the 335 
dimension ‘adaptability’ which was found to assess how an organization’s culture prepares, 336 
accepts, and sustains changes. The capability characteristics were also reviewed to better 337 
understand if these were described as organizational norms e.g., ‘people system’ in stage react 338 
‘Individuals are recognized sporadically after having solved a food safety problem’ was not 339 
changed as this was already defined as an organizational norm whereas the capability area 340 
‘perceived value’ in stage internalized ‘ongoing business improvement and growth enabled by 341 
food safety’ was found not defined as an organizational norm and redefined to ‘Frontline 342 
employees are trusted to act correct and celebrate food safety performance on their line/in their 343 
area.’ The content for each value and stage intersect was redefined as norms by finishing the 344 
sentence ‘Food safety <VALUE> at company x can be described as <STAGE> through …’ This 345 
was different from the content of the original model (Jespersen et al. 2016) where content was 346 
derived by summarizing the behaviours behind each capability area and stage. This method ties 347 
dimensions, values, and norms to food safety culture through each stage of maturity, resulting in 348 
a model that is simpler for organizations to apply in the context of their own organizational 349 
values and norms. This also provides a path to improve food safety culture directly tied to stated 350 
value, norms, and organizational effectiveness as demonstrated by other studies (Denison et al., 351 
2012; Graham et al., 2017; Kotter & Heskett, 1992). A fifth dimension specific to ‘Hazards and 352 
Risks’ was added as this was a significant topic during the interviews and was included to reflect 353 
the importance of organizational awareness specific to a company’s products and processes.  354 
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This dimension was also found to be included in other food safety culture assessment systems 355 
(De Boeck, Mortier, Jacxsens, Dequidt, & Vlerick, 2017) through the comparative analysis of 356 
Jespersen, Griffiths and Wallace (2017). 357 
3.4 Estimation of cost of poor quality 358 
The cost of poor quality (COPQ) was calculated using the proposed percentage of sales 359 
per maturity stage (Table 6) (Crosby, 1972).  360 
(Table 6) 361 
To enable this calculation, the stage descriptors in  the food safety maturity model were 362 
aligned to the stages of the Crosby model. For example, Crosby’s stage 1 describes a stage of  363 
‘reacting’ ‘blaming’ hiding’, and ‘firefighting’ similar behaviours are included in the stage 1 of 364 
the food safety maturity model. The Crosby model also describes a progressive maturation from 365 
reacting to understanding to integration of quality. The food safety model applies a similar 366 
progressive maturation specific to food safety. 367 
The COPQ results were estimated by applying the percentages in table 6 to each of the 368 
company’s annualized sales in U.S. dollars and the mean maturity that had been calculated using 369 
the triangulation method. A mean COPQ (based on actual maturity assessment) and estimates for 370 
moving one stage up and one stage down on the maturity model were estimated to illustrate the 371 
cost of a deteriorating food safety culture compared to an improved food safety culture.  372 
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These estimates are indented to illustrate the potential economic impact of food safety maturity 373 
and to call upon further empirical research to validate the food safety components of each of the 374 
four components of COPQ (table 1). 375 
3.5 Development of dynamic model for food safety culture 376 
 Through the study of existing research of organizational culture, organizational 377 
effectiveness, and economic impact (Denison, 1997; Graham et al., 2017; Kotter & Heskett, 378 
1992) a summary of key learnings was developed and this information was used to identify 379 
potential building blocks of a dynamic model for food safety culture. The findings from this 380 
existing research in organizational culture were augmented with the findings from research of 381 
food safety culture where predictive validity had been proven by Ball (Ball et al., 2009), De 382 
Boeck (De Boeck et al., 2017), Hinsz (Hinsz & Nickell, 2015),  Jespersen and Edwards 383 
(Jespersen & Edwards, Submitted), and the results of this study. Synthesising the information 384 
from these sources and discussion and integration within this academic and industry-based 385 
research team allowed the establishment of likely building blocks and design of the suggested 386 
model of dynamic interactions between building blocks.   387 
  388 
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4. Results 389 
4.1 Organizational characteristics 390 
 Organizational characteristics were calculated based on demographic data collected in 391 
the survey (Table 7). 392 
(Table 7) 393 
Mean age of respondents (n=816) was 34-44 years, with 10-14 years of experience in the 394 
food industry and current company, and 5-9 years in current role. Comparing the individual 395 
company mean to this baseline group mean, respondents in company A were older – 45-54 years. 396 
Respondents in company B had less experience in both current company and role – 5-9 years. 397 
Respondents in company C also had less experience – 5-9 years in current company but 2-4 398 
years in role and thereby the least experience in the study. Respondents in company D were older 399 
than the mean baseline – 45-54 years and had the longest tenure in the industry – 15-19 years and 400 
the company and role – 10-14 years. Respondents in company E also had shorter tenure in their 401 
current role – 2-4 years, but unlike company C, were at baseline for experience in both industry 402 
and company – 10-14 years. Mean industry tenure (F (3, 925) = 6.88,  p  < .001), company 403 
tenure (F (3, 925) = 5.74,  p  < .001), tenure in current role (F (3, 925) = 5.89,  p  < .001) and age 404 
(F (4, 925) = 7.65,  p  < .001) were all found to be significantly different between the companies.  405 
Functional ratios (%MFG/%FSQ) for companies A, B, and D were similar – 86/13, 406 
82/18, and 85/12. Respondents from company C were mostly involved in manufacturing – 92/8; 407 
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while company E had the lowest participation from manufacturing – 78/22. Despite these 408 
differences, many respondents in all companies were, not surprisingly, from manufacturing. It 409 
should be noted that manufacturing in this context includes all functions except food safety and 410 
quality with a direct reporting relationship to a senior manufacturing leader e.g., S. VP 411 
Manufacturing or plant manager (e.g., sanitation, maintenance, and finance).  412 
The span of control ratios (%Leader/%Supervisor) for companies A and E were similar – 413 
37/63 and 35/65 – with these companies providing most supervisors in the study. Respondents 414 
for company B had slightly more supervisors responding at 46/54 and company’s C and D had 415 
the most leaders of the five companies responding – 58/42 and 55/45.    416 
4.2 Food safety maturity 417 
Based on the self-assessment scale, aggregated maturity for companies A, B, and D were 418 
in the ‘Know’ stage at 3.36, 3.31, and 3.05. Company C had the lowest maturity of 2.80 and in 419 
the ‘React’ stage. Finally, company E had the highest maturity of 4.01 and in the ‘Predict’ stage 420 
(Table 8).  421 
Maturity was found to be significantly different (F (4, 785) = 5.727,  p < .001) across the 422 
five companies. In analysing social desirability, the companies were also found to be 423 
significantly different, (F (4, 460) = 10.079, p  < .001). Companies A and E scored the lowest at 424 
mean 4.10 and 4.98 out of a total possible score of 18. Company C had the highest score of all at 425 
7.56 with companies B and D lower at 7.16 and 6.67 respectively. Maturity was also found to be 426 
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significantly different between functions (F (4, 460) = 10.079, p  < .001). FSQ rated on average 427 
maturity 16% higher than manufacturing and other functions. Span of control also influenced 428 
maturity ratings and were significantly different (F (4, 460) = 10.079, p < .001). As such, 429 
average maturity rating of supervisors was 28% lower than that of leaders. This supports the 430 
findings by Manning (2017) who investigated the impact of subcultures on food safety 431 
management and the stratification that naturally occurred due to these sub-cultures (Manning, 432 
2017). 433 
The individual triangulation scores (Figure 1) shows how the assessment results vary by method 434 
with the self-assessment scores (black circle) tends to show a higher maturity score then those of 435 
the interviews and performance document reviews.  436 
(Figure 1) 437 
4.3 Revised food safety maturity model 438 
Based on the method described in section 3.3. food safety maturity model 1.0 (Jespersen 439 
et al., 2016) was updated to version 2.0 (Table 9).  Dimensions and values that were updated are 440 
highlighted in table 9. 441 
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Table 1: Food safety culture - maturity model version 2.0 442 
 443 
(Table 9)444 
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4.4 Estimated cost of poor quality and economic impact 445 
Company A spent most, due to it also having the highest annualized sales, but this was 446 
followed by company C with the second highest COPQ due to its low maturity rating. 447 
Collectively it is estimated that the companies spent $1.14 billion in sales on COPQ annually in 448 
their current stages of maturity. If they all slide down one maturity stage they would spend an 449 
additional $0.38 billions of sales and if they all move up one stage they save an additional $0.43 450 
billions of sales (Figure 2).  451 
(Figure 2) 452 
 453 
4.5 Suggested model of dynamic interactions in food safety culture  454 
The suggested model of dynamic interactions  developed through this research is portrayed in 455 
Figure 3. This is presented as a model for further testing and examples are given to illustrate the 456 
dynamic nature of the model and the connectivity between the building blocks and interactions in 457 
response to a food safety marketplace trigger. 458 
The structure consists of cultural building blocks and dynamic interactions. Each building 459 
block is connected to others through the interactions. There are four main building blocks; I. 460 
Organizational effectiveness, II. Organizational culture norms, III. Working group learned and 461 
shared assumptions, and behaviours, and IV. Individual intent and behaviours. There are seven 462 
interactions between the building blocks that indicate how each building block is either 463 
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influenced or is influencing. For example, the external environment influences an organizations 464 
culture and norms e.g., recall of products from a competitor, a shortage of qualified employees 465 
(arrow #1). Such interactions can cause a review of formal systems arrow e.g., are policies and 466 
procedures actually guiding behaviours and actions everyday? (arrow #2) and the organizations 467 
values e.g., is a value of ‘integrity’ translated in to behaviours of ‘see something – say 468 
something’ everyday? (arrow #3) which in turn triggers an alignment of values to the formal 469 
systems e.g., is a value of ‘integrity’ translated into the formal system for performance 470 
evaluation? The organizations norms influence how working groups take decisions everyday 471 
e.g., recognizing those that consistently bring forward issues to solve (arrow #5) and the 472 
individual’s intent to behave (arrow #6 and #7) e.g., ‘I see others get recognized by our manager 473 
when speaking up, I better do so as well if something needs correction. 474 
(Figure 3) 475 
5. Discussion 476 
This research sought to address three areas to further the scientific knowledge base for 477 
food safety culture, 1) validating or revising the initial food safety maturity model based on new 478 
learnings, 2) applying the principles of cost of poor quality to assessing economic value of 479 
maturing food safety culture, and 3) suggesting a dynamic model that captures the constant 480 
interactions that cause cultures to adapt to and integrate change. 481 
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By applying three data collection methods (Jespersen & Wallace, 2017) the research was 482 
able to calculate a food safety maturity score for five global companies and 21 of their 483 
manufacturing plants. The companies aggregated maturity scores were found to be significantly 484 
different and ranging from stage 2 – Doubt – to stage 4 – Predict of the food safety maturity 485 
model. The qualitative data gathered through the coding of 379 performance documents and 42 486 
interviews with plant leaders and food safety managers were applied to further develop the 487 
existing food safety maturity model (Jespersen et al 2016). The maturity model was redefined to 488 
provide a path for food manufacturers seeking to improve their food safety culture and to provide 489 
a link to existing literature on cost of poor quality as a function of organizational maturity 490 
(Crosby, 1972; Duffy, 2017; Schiffauerova & Thomson, 2006). It was found that dimensions of 491 
food safety culture could be described across the maturity model stages in forms of norms, e.g., 492 
‘Frontline teams and supervisors make use of leading indicators to improve food safety systems’ 493 
(dimension = consistency), to better integrate food safety into a food company’s existing values. 494 
A fifth dimension was added ‘Risks and Hazards’ to better link the importance of hazard 495 
awareness and learnings from HACCP deployment (Wallace, 2009; Wallace, Holyoak, Powell, 496 
& Dykes, 2012). This Risks and Hazards dimension was identified by Jespersen, Griffiths and 497 
Wallace (2017) in their comparative analysis of existing food safety culture evaluation systems.  498 
It has been questioned whether this dimension should be part of a food safety culture framework 499 
or whether it should be considered in the evaluation of food safety management systems and risk 500 
awareness (Jespersen and Wallace, 2017) as it is one of the least tangible and least defined 501 
dimensions in food safety culture research (De Boeck et al. 2018). However, it was included due 502 
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to the importance of understanding the organization’s overall approach to managing risks and 503 
hazards as opposed to the technical detail of hazard analysis which is addressed in food safety 504 
management systems. It is hoped that the delineation of maturity over the Risks and Hazards 505 
dimension presented here will help to further understanding of the interactions between cultural 506 
and technical systems in food safety.  507 
By use of the maturity model and the data collected, an aggregated maturity score was 508 
used to calculate aggregated ‘cost of poor quality’ per company to demonstrate the economic 509 
impact the maturity of the company’s food safety culture. This cost varied substantially by 510 
company, partially due to the dependence on company sales in the equation and the difference in 511 
food safety maturity level. As such, cost of poor quality ranged from $400M to $2.4B when 512 
calculated using Crosby’s guidance for percentage per maturity stage (Crosby, 1972). It shows 513 
the significance of food safety maturity and its potential economic impact on a food 514 
manufacturer’s performance.        515 
To realize this economic value the research suggests a need to apply learnings from 516 
studies that have demonstrated predictive validity of cultural factors and their impact on food 517 
safety behaviours and performance. As such, a dynamic model of food safety culture is proposed 518 
to better understand the interactions that must be considered when taking steps to mature food 519 
safety culture. The four building blocks are: organizational effectiveness, organizational culture 520 
norms, learned and shared assumptions of working groups, and individual intent and behaviours. 521 
It is proposed that it is through actions and interactions between these building blocks that a food 522 
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manufacturer’s food safety culture maturity can be evaluated and improved such that the 523 
individual employee adapts to organizational norm. 524 
This research builds on empirical findings from studies conducted on organizational 525 
culture (Denison, 1997; Graham et al., 2017; Guiso et al., 2014; Kotter & Heskett, 1992) and as 526 
such is an adaptation of proven relations between organizational culture and economic 527 
performance, as well as the connection between culture, values, norms, and behaviours. The 528 
research also makes use of predictive research conducted specifically in the food safety domain 529 
and further develops the field of food safety culture by integrating factors impacting food safety 530 
performance in the revised maturity model and the food safety culture dynamic model building 531 
blocks.  532 
It is through the integration of all cultural building blocks and interactions rather than 533 
through focus on a single block or action that sustainable results are achieved, that food safety 534 
culture is matured, and the company can realize both risk reduction and economic gain. This 535 
research is innovative in that it connects maturity, cost of poor quality, and predictive factors of 536 
food safety.  537 
The limitations in the research lie in its geographical reach, as the participating 538 
organizations are global but with headquarters situated in North America. In addition, the five 539 
companies were approached to participate in the study based on their previous interests in the 540 
subject and willingness to have the researcher collect data virtually and on-site in all their 541 
manufacturing plants.  As such, the findings may have been affected by existing company 542 
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interests in food safety culture and the results cannot be generalised across all food 543 
manufacturing plants.  Also, the theoretical application of the COPQ proportions has yet to be 544 
tested in practice within the food industry. Further research is needed to empirically demonstrate 545 
the connection between food safety culture and economic performance and this should be global 546 
in scope and include food manufacturing companies of all sizes and representative of all 547 
commodities. Similarly, further research is needed to test the food safety dynamic model and 548 
interactions across a range of food industry organizations. 549 
In conclusion, as food companies recognize more and more the strategic importance of 550 
their food safety culture, its reliable and valid evaluation gains importance. This research 551 
provides a framework for maturing food safety culture to be integrated into an organization’s 552 
culture, its values, and norms. By quantifying food safety maturity using a validated, 553 
triangulation method, companies can estimate the proportion of their sales wasted through cost of 554 
poor quality, and design interventions specific to the four cultural building blocks individually 555 
proven to impact food safety performance.  This might facilitate a change in the design of 556 
interventions to strengthen food safety management and control activities. 557 
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The impact of maturing food safety culture and a pathway to economic gain – 562 
Tables and Figures 563 
 564 
Table 2: COPQ activities and examples of possible quality and food safety activities(Adapted from Duffy, 2017, 565 
Hutton, 2001; Surak & Wilson, 2007; Wallace, Sperber, & Mortimore, 2011; Mortimore and Wallace, 2013) 566 
COPQ activities Quality examples Food safety examples 
Prevention cost Establish specification for 
incoming ingredients and all 
employee training. 
Metal detector calibration, process 
equipment preventative 
maintenance, and all employee 
training. 
Appraisal cost Quality audits. 
Checking incoming ingredients 
against specification. 
Food safety audits. 
Metal detector checks, 
environmental monitoring, and 
GMP audits. 
Internal failure cost Waste in the form of products that 
cannot be shipped. 




Product withdrawal. Product recall. 
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Table 3: Financial performance differences between companies who invested in a performance-enhancing culture 567 
and those that did not (Kotter and Heskett, 1992). 568 
 Average increase for 12 
firms with performance-
enhancing cultures 




Revenue growth 682% 166% 
Employment growth 282% 36% 
Stock price growth 901% 74% 
Net income growth 756% 1% 
 569 
Table 4: Sample statements per area in the self-assessment questionnaire 570 
 571 
Table 5: Maturity model construct 572 
Area Sample statements 
Social norms Most people whose opinion I value would approve if I review the preventive control 
plan(s) quarterly to verify effectiveness. 
Most people whose opinion I value would approve if I always acknowledge 
manufacturing leaders who make good food safety decisions. 
 
Behavioural intent I will do all I can whenever my team does not have the right tools to complete food 
safety tasks. 
I will improve food safety processes every day 
Motivation I want to do what my manager thinks I should do for food safety.  
I want to do what I have learned through food safety training. 
Social desirability I appreciate other people’s opinions regarding food safety. 
It bothers me if people dislike me because of my views about food safety. 
 Stages 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 









able 7: Maturity stages and cost of quality as percentage of sales (Crosby, 1972). 579 
 580 











solved by the 
quality 
department 
and mostly to 








acts to improve 
food safety. 
Food safety actions 
are taken based 


















safety tasks out 


































 A B C D E Total 
(Mean) 
Number of plants 11 3 2 2 3 21 
Survey Response rate 
(Percentage) 
72 77 72.5 77 59 (72) 
Performance documents (#) 268 3 33 50 25 379 
Interviews (#) 22 8 4 4 4 42 
Maturity stage 1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage (%) 20 18 12 8 2.5 
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Table 8: Aggregated company demographics and baseline (mean and total) 581 
*Manufacturing and Food Safety & Quality 582 
Table 9: Food safety maturity by company 583 
 584 
 585 
Category Measure Company 
  A B C D E Mean 
(Total) 
Demographics # plants 11 4 2 2 2 (21) 
 Years in food industry 
(mean) 
10-14 10-14 10-14 15-19 10-14 10-14 
 Years in the company 
(mean) 
10-14 5-9 5-9 10-14 10-14 10-14 
 Years in current role (mean) 5-9 5-9 2-4 10-14 2-4 5-9 
 Age (mean) 45-54 34-44 34-44 45-54 34-44 34-44 
Functional distribution 
(%MFG/%FSQ*) 










Category Measure Company 




Culture Stage Know Know React Know Predict Know 
Maturity [1-5] 3.36 3.31 2.80 3.05 4.01 3.3 






Figure 1: Plant Maturity - Plot of mean values as per method triangulation. Ledger: Dot = Self-assessment scale 
result, Diamond – Performance document coding result, and Triangle = Interview coding result. 
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Table 10: Food safety culture - maturity model version 2.0 586 



















Employees have little 
trust that management 
will act on food 
safety without 
external pressure 
Employees trust that 
management will act 
and do the right thing 
for food safety after 
an issue have 
occurred 
Everyone trusts that 
food safety issues are 
solved because we 
know it protects our 
business 
Everybody is trusted 
to invest in food 




are trusted to act 
correct and celebrate 
food safety 
performance on their 
line/in their area 
Being 
responsible 
Nobody knows who 
has the duty to deal 
with food safety 
Everybody readily 
takes responsibility, 
but it is unclear what 
that means 
Detailed food safety 
responsibility is 
written into job 
descriptions for 
everybody 
Decision makers are 
certified food safety 
professionals and 
responsible for 
driving cost out of the 
food safety system 
Frontline is responsible 
for bubbling 
improvement plans to 
leaders, leaders are 
responsible for 
incorporating these 
into long-term business 
planning 














People System Reward and 
recognize 
Individuals complete 
food safety tasks out 





having solved a food 
safety problem 
Leaders recognize 
teams and individuals 
according to a 
documented system 
of positive and 
negative 
consequences 
Leaders reward teams 
for collectively 
improving food safety 
processes/procedures 
Cross functional/level 
teams nominate other 
teams for being 
proactive and thinking 




Top-down ‘tell’ with 
little ‘why’ content 
and understanding of 





FSQ as problems 
occur using, if 
available, facts 
discovered as the 
problem was solved 
There is a deep 
understanding of the 
food safety system 
and performance is 
communicated by 
some functional 
leaders on a regular 
basis 










cadence is an 
organizational habit 
that involves
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588 Adaptability Innovate Scrambling to meet 
changed requirements 
Aware of coming 
change but do not 
update procedures 
before last minute 
Change is analysed 
and incorporated into 





Innovation is driven 
by data internally to 
reduce food safety 
costs 
Innovation is suggested 
by frontline teams and 
bubbling up to impact 
companywide system. 
Quick to adapt as they 
have technology 
interface in their hands  
Embrace and 
drive change 
Nothing is stable, so 
it does not matter if 
we must 
change…again 
We know change is 
coming and will deal 
with it last minute… 
We know the change 
and have analysed the 
impact on individuals 
and teams according 
to a pre-defined 
change curve… 
We look for cost 
reduction 
opportunities and 




Frontline teams have 
full autonomy to drive 
change in the food 
safety system, support 
teams are responsible 
for spreading new and 
best practices across 
the company… 
Consistency Data and 
reporting  
Data are not used to 
solve problems and 
mostly sitting in a 
filing cabinet or in 
unused reports 
It is left to the 
individual to identify 
needed data and ways 
to derive information 
from these 
Leading indicators 
are used to find root 
causes of food safety 
problems and 
solutions are built 








Frontline teams and 
supervisors make use 
of leading indicators to 




Little to no new value 
placed on buying or 
adopting technology 
Technology is bought 
in reaction to a 
specific need e.g., 
faster pathogen 
testing results  
Technology is seen in 
the context of the 






Automation is used 
frequently and seen 
as an integral part of 
reducing food safety 
cost 
Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) is used 
in an integrated way 
with automated 
workflows that make 
the enterprise quick to 
adapt 
Quality of all 
we do 
Unstructured problem 
solving to remove the 
immediate pain 
‘plan, do, check, act’ 
with emphasis on 
control and 
expectation of 100% 




solving with high risk 
of analysis paralysis 
‘plan, do, study, act’ 
with emphasis on 








by mitigation plans 




Risk perception The organization 
relies mostly on 
external sources and 
inspections to 
understand and act on 
its risks and doesn't 
identify risks 
internally 
Actions to manage 
risks are mostly taken 
in response to 





Risks are understood 
and continually 
challenged by a 
cross-functional team 
through planned risk 
management 
Understanding and 
reducing risks are an 




The organization relies 
on frontline teams to 
manage existing risks 
and to identify new 
ones through peer 
observations 
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  589 
 590 
Figure 2: Annualized sales per company and COPQ based on evaluation result (bar), one maturity stage up (dot), 591 
and one stage down (diamond). 592 
 593 
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   597 
 598 
  599 
‘Interactions’ e.g., adapt and integrate 
Culture building blocks 
I. Organizational effectiveness 
II. Organizational culture 
norms 
Formal systems 
III. Working group learned and shared assumptions  
and behavours 
Values 







Figure 3: Dynamic model of a culture of food safety  
External environment boundary 
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Annex 1: Coding process applied to deriving data through content analysis (Source: Jespersen 600 
and Wallace, 2017) 601 
 602 
  603 
 604 
  605 
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 606 
Annex 11: Coding framework used in the content analysis of textual data (Semi-structured 607 





Values and Mission Compliance.  
Measures/metrics/KPIs. 




Responsibility, accountability, commitment.  
Direction, setting expectations, corporate direction. 
Financials, budgets, and prioritizing. 
People Systems Any reference to persons’ role/education/job and group or team and   references to individuals. 
Behaviour/practice, work routine.  




Rewards and celebration. 
Training, education, learning, proficiency.  
Cross-functional. 
Unionized. 
Rotation and retention. 
“Making choices…” 
Consistency Actions, tasks, action due date. 
Non-conformance, reoccurring.  
Technology. 
Tools, infrastructure, and policies/procedures.  
References to third party standards. 
Problems, breakdowns, and issues. 
Adaptability Change readiness, open to change, change ready.  
Improvement, must improve, continuous improvement, improvement process, improvement 
system, continuous improvement, Six Sigma, Lean manufacturing. 
Risks and Hazards Leaders risk awareness and perception. 
Operator risk awareness and perception. 
Risks, hazards. 
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